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Abstract— According to the traditional probability theory,
events with a positive but very small probability can occur
(although very rarely). For example, from the purely mathematical viewpoint, it is possible that the thermal motion of all
the molecules in a coffee cup goes in the same direction, so this
cup will start lifting up.
In contrast, physicists believe that events with extremely small
probability cannot occur. In this paper, we show that to get
a consistent formalization of this belief, we need, in addition
to the original probability measure, to also consider a maxitive
(possibility) measure.

I. P HYSICISTS A SSUME THAT I NITIAL C ONDITIONS AND
VALUES OF PARAMETERS ARE N OT A BNORMAL
To a mathematician, the main contents of a physical theory
is the equations. The fact that the theory is formulated in terms
of well-defined mathematical equations means that the actual
field must satisfy these equations. However, this fact does not
mean that every solution of these equations has a physical
sense. Let us give three examples:
Example 1. At any temperature greater than absolute zero,
particles are randomly moving. It is theoretically possible that
all the particles start moving in one direction, and, as a result,
a person starts lifting up into the air. The probability of this
event is small (but positive), so, from the purely mathematical
viewpoint, we can say that this event is possible but highly
unprobable. However, the physicists say plainly that such an
abnormal event is impossible (see, e.g., [5]).
Example 2. Another example from statistical physics: Suppose
that we have a two-chamber camera. The left chamber is
empty, the right one has gas in it. If we open the door between
the chambers, then the gas would spread evenly between the
two chambers. It is theoretically possible (under appropriately
chosen initial conditions) that the gas that was initially evenly
distributed would concentrate in one camera. However, physicists believe this abnormal event to be impossible. This is an
example of a “micro-reversible” process: on the atomic level,
all equations are invariant with respect to changing the order
of time flow (t → −t). So, if we have a process that goes
from state A to state B, then, if while at B, we revert all the

velocities of all the atoms, we will get a process that goes
from B to A.
However, in real life, many processes are clearly irreversible: an explosion can shatter a statue but it is hard to
imagine an inverse process: an implosion that glues together
shattered pieces into a statue. Boltzmann himself, the 19th
century author of statistical physics, explicitly stated that such
inverse processes “may be regarded as impossible, even though
from the viewpoint of probability theory that outcome is only
extremely improbable, not impossible.” [1].
Example 3. If we toss a fair coin 100 times in a row, and
get heads all the time, then a person who is knowledgeable in
probability would say that it is possible – since the probability
is still positive. On the other hand, a physicist (or any person
who uses common sense reasoning) would say that the coin is
not fair – because if it is was a fair coin, then this abnormal
event would be impossible.
In all these cases, physicists (implicitly or explicitly) require
that the actual values of the physical quantities must not only
satisfy the equations but they must also satisfy the additional
condition: that the initial conditions should not be abnormal.
Comment. In all these examples, a usual mathematician’s
response to physicists’ calling some low-probability events
“impossible”, is just to say that the physicists use imprecise
language.
It is indeed true that the physicists use imprecise language,
and it is also true that in the vast majority of practical applications, a usual probabilistic interpretation of this language
perfectly well describes the intended physicists’ meaning. In
other words, the probability language is perfectly OK for most
physical applications.
However, there are some situations when the physicists’
intuition seem to differ from the results of applying traditional
probability techniques:
• From the probability theory viewpoint, there is no fundamental difference between such low-probability events
as a person winning a lottery and the same person being

lifted up into the air by the Brownian motion. If a person
plays the lottery again and again, then – provided that this
person lives for millions of years – he will eventually win.
Similarly, if a person stands still every morning, then –
provided that this person lives long enough – this person
will fly up into the air.
• On the other hand, from the physicist viewpoint, there
is a drastic difference between these two low-probability
events: yes, a person will win a lottery but no, a person
will never lift up into the air no matter how many times
this person stands still.
We have just mentioned that the traditional mathematical
approach is to treat this difference of opinion as simply caused
by the imprecision of the physicists’ language. What we plan
to show is that if we take this difference more seriously and
develop a new formalism that more accurately captures the
physicists’ reasoning, then we may end up with results and
directions that are, in our opinion, of potential interest to
foundations of physics.
In other words, what we plan to show is that if we continue
to use the traditional probability approach, it is perfectly OK
but if we try to formalize the physicists’ opinion more closely,
we may sometimes get even better results.
Comment. It is known that the probabilistic approach is, in
principle, quite capable of describing uncertainty in physical
systems; in particular, the probabilistic approach is capable
of describing rare events in physical systems. Some problems
related to rare events require new probabilistic techniques, but
overall, within a traditional probabilistic approach, there seems
to be no need to introduce possibility measures.
It is also known that possibility measures can be useful for
physical applications, e.g., to reflect considerable vagueness
in the dynamical laws of complex physical systems, to describe the vague, fuzzy character of the experts (= physicists)
knowledge about these systems.
What we plan to show, in this paper, is that there is
one more area where possibility measures can be helpful in
physical applications: in describing the physicists’ intuition
about rare events, an intuition that is somewhat different from
its traditional probabilistic description.
II. A S EEMINGLY NATURAL F ORMALIZATION OF T HIS
I DEA
The above-mentioned property of being “not abnormal”
(“typical”) has a natural formalization: if a probability p(E)
of an event E is small enough, i.e., if p(E) ≤ p0 for some
very small threshold p0 , then this event cannot happen.
In other words, there exists the “smallest possible probability” p0 such that:
• if the computed probability p of some event is larger than
p0 , then this event can occur, while
• if the computed probability p is ≤ p0 , the event cannot
occur.
For example, the probability that a fair coin falls heads 100
times in a row is 2−100 , so, if the threshold probability p0

satisfies the inequality p0 ≥ 2−100 , then we will be able to
conclude that such an event is impossible.
III. T HE A BOVE F ORMALIZATION OF THE N OTION OF
“T YPICAL” IS N OT A LWAYS A DEQUATE
The problem with this approach is that every sequence
of heads and tails has exactly the same probability. So, if
we choose p0 ≥ 2−100 , we will thus exclude all possible
sequences of 100 heads and tails as physically impossible.
However, anyone can toss a coin 100 times, and this proves
that some such sequences are physically possible.
The threshold should depend on the complexity of the
property: for simple properties, it should be larger, but for
complex properties (e.g., described by a specific sequence of
0s and 1s), it should be smaller.
Historical comment. This problem was first noticed by Kyburg
under the name of Lottery paradox [10]: in a big (e.g., statewide) lottery, the probability of winning the Grand Prize is so
small that a reasonable person should not expect it. However,
some people do win big prizes.
IV. R ELATION TO N ON -M ONOTONIC R EASONING
Lottery paradox has been known for several decades, and
many solutions have been proposed to resolve this paradox.
One possible solutions comes from the fact that in deriving
the above paradox, we used classical logic, a logic that is
monotonic in the following sense: once we made a logical
conclusion, this conclusion remains valid no matter what new
knowledge we acquire. In classical logic, if we increase the
set of facts and rules, the set of conclusions can only increase.
Our objective, however, is to formalize expert reasoning
(specifically, physicists’ reasoning), and it is known that the
expert reasoning is, in general, not monotonic. For example,
if we know that birds normally fly, and we see a bird, then we
normally conclude that this bird can fly. However, if it later
turns out that this bird is an abnormal bird, e.g., a penguin,
that we take back our original conclusion and conclude that
this particular bird does not fly.
It is known that if we take the non-monotonic character of
expert reasoning into consideration, then the lottery paradox
stops being a paradox, it becomes simply one of the nonmonotonic features of expert reasoning; see, e.g., Poole [11],
[12] (see also [8]). Specifically, if we use formalisms like
default logic that have been designed to capture commonsense
reasoning, we can explain the above paradox.
From the pragmatic viewpoint, this approach is very satisfactory; however, from the foundational viewpoint, the existing
description of commonsense non-monotonic reasoning is still
being developed, better and better semantics of non-monotonic
reasoning – in particular, reasoning about what is typical and
what is normal – are appearing all the time.
What we plan to do in this paper is restrict ourselves only to
the description of rare events. For this narrow specialized area
of reasoning, we will provide a formalization of the notions
of “typical” and “normal”, and thus, in effect, we provide a
specific non-monotonic logic – a logic is reasonably final (and

thus, does not depend on the fact that the general description
of non-monotonic reasoning is still far from being final).
Comment. It is worth mentioning that there is an interesting
alternative approach to the above solution of the lottery paradox: namely, we can, alternatively, conclude that our intuition
is simply wrong and that events with very small (even 0)
probability can actually happen.
This alternative approach was pioneered by such wellknown specialists in philosophical foundations of probability
theory as K. Popper and B. de Finetti (see, e.g., [3]). This approach is currently being successfully developed by G. Coletti,
A. Gilio, R. Scozzafava, W. Spohn, and others (see, e.g., [2]
and references therein). Within this alternative approach, there
is a natural hierarchy of zero probability events (induced by
the corresponding conditional probabilities), and this hierarchy
also leads to a maxitive measure!
Since our objective is to formalize the physicists’ intuition,
not to reject it, we do not follow this alternative approach.
However, the very fact that both approaches lead to the same
formalism of maxitive measures makes us think that maybe
there is a deep relation and similarity between these two
approaches.
V. N EW I DEA
“Abnormal” means something unusual, rarely happening: if
something is rare enough, it is not typical (“abnormal”). Let
us describe what, e.g., an abnormal height may mean. If a
person’s height is ≥ 6 ft, it is still normal (although it may
be considered abnormal in some parts of the world). Now, if
instead of 6 ft, we consider 6 ft 1 in, 6 ft 2 in, etc., then sooner
or later we will end up with a height h0 such that everyone who
is taller than h0 will be definitely called atypical, abnormal (to
be more precise, a person of abnormal height). We may not
be sure what exactly value h experts will use as a threshold
for “abnormal” but we are sure that such a value exists.
While every person whose height is > h0 is definitely
atypical, a person whose height is below h0 is not necessarily
typical: he may be atypical because of some other properties.
For example, we may consider people atypical because of an
unusual weight. Similarly, there exists a weight w0 such that
everyone whose weight exceeds w0 will be called atypical.
Let us express the above idea is general terms. We have a
universal set, i.e., the set U of all objects that we will consider.
In the above example, U is the set of all people. Some of the
elements of the set U are abnormal (in some sense), and some
are not. Let us denote the set of all elements that are typical
(not abnormal) by T .
On the set U , we have several decreasing sequences
 of sets
A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ An ⊇ . . . with the property that An = ∅.

is ≥ 160 lb, A3 is the set of all people whose weight is ≥ 170
lb, etc.
We know that for each of these sequences, if we take a
sufficiently large n, then all elements of An are abnormal (i.e.,
none of them belongs to the set T of not abnormal elements).
In mathematical terms, this means that for some integer N ,
we have AN ∩ T = ∅.
Let us describe this idea in precise terms [8]. Let L be
a theory. A set is L-definable if we can explicitly define it
in L. (The set of all real numbers, the set of all solutions
of a well-defined equation, every set that we can describe in
mathematical terms is L-definable.)
Our objective is to be able to make mathematical statements
about L-definable sets. Therefore, in addition to the theory L,
we must have a stronger theory M in which the class of all
L-definable sets is a set – and it is a countable set.
Definition 1. Let U be a universal set. A non-empty set T ⊆ U
is called a set of typical (not abnormal) elements if for every
L-definablesequence of sets An for which An ⊇ An+1 for
all n and An = ∅, there exists an integer N for which
n

AN ∩ T = ∅.
Example. In the above coin example, U = {H, T}IN , and An
is the set of all the sequences that start with n heads and
have at least one tail. The sequence {An } is decreasing and
L-definable, and its intersection is empty. Therefore, for every
set T of typical elements of U , there exists an integer N for
which AN ∩ T = ∅. This means that if a sequence s ∈ T is
not abnormal and starts with N heads, it must consist of heads
only. In physical terms, it means a random sequence (i.e., a
sequence that contains both heads and tails) cannot start with
N heads – which is exactly what we wanted to formalize.
VI. M AIN R ESULT: R ELATION TO P OSSIBILITY M EASURES
To describe a set of typical elements, we ascribe, to each
definable monotonic sequence {An }, the smallest integer
N ({An }) for which AN ∩ T = ∅. This integer can be
viewed as measure of complexity of the sequence: for simple
sequences, it is smaller, for more complex sequences, it is
larger.
In terms of this complexity, the above definition of typical
elements can be reformulated as follows: an element x ∈ U is
typical if and only if for every definable decreasing sequence
{An } with an empty intersection, x ∈ AN , where N =
N ({An } is the complexity of this sequence.
It turns out that N ({An }) is a maxitive (possibility) measure
in the following sense:
Proposition 1. N ({An ∪ Bn }) = max(N ({An }), N ({Bn })).

n

In the height example, A1 is the set of all people whose
height is ≥ 6 ft, A2 is the set of all people whose height is
≥ 6 ft 1 in, A3 is the set of all people whose height is ≥ 6 ft
2 in, etc.
In the weight example, A1 is the set of all people whose
weight is ≥ 150 lb, A2 is the set of all people whose weight

Proof. Indeed, N ({An ∪ Bn }) is the smallest value N for
which (AN ∪BN )∩T = ∅, i.e., for which no element of AN ∪
BN is typical. This is equivalent to saying that no element of
AN is typical and no element of BN is typical. In other words,
(AN ∪ BN ) ∩ T = ∅ ↔ ((AN ∩ T = ∅) & (BN ∩ T = ∅)).

Hence, N ({An ∪Bn }) is indeed the largest of the two numbers
N ({An }) and N ({Bn })). Q.E.D.
Comment. If An ⊆ Bn for all n, then Proposition 1 implies
that N ({An }) ≤ N ({Bn }), i.e., that this complexity measure
is monotonic.
Since An ∩ Bn ⊆ An and An ∩ Bn ⊆ Bn , we can thus
conclude that N ({An ∩ Bn }) ≤ min(N ({An }), N ({Bn })).
Comment. One can easily see that a proof similar to our proof
of Proposition 1 leads +to a more general result:
Proposition2. For every definable sequence of sequences
α
α
{Aα
n }, N ({ An }) = max(N ({An })).
α

α

Comment. Another relation between the set of typical elements
and possibility (maxitive) measures is described in [7].
VII. P OSSIBLE P RACTICAL U SE OF T HIS I DEA : W HEN TO
S TOP AN I TERATIVE A LGORITHM
In numerical mathematics, we often know an iterative
process whose results xk are known to converge to the desired
solution x, but we do not know when to stop in order to
guarantee the given accuracy ε – i.e., to guarantee that the
distance dX (xn , x) between the numerical result xn and the
actual solution x does not exceed ε. In these cases, heuristic
methods are used:
Usually, in iterative methods, if xk = xk+1 , then xk is the
required solution. Therefore, if xk and xk+1 are close, we can
conclude that we are close to the solution. Hence, we stop
when the consequent values xk become close enough, i.e.,
when dX (xk , xk+1 ) ≤ δ for some δ > 0.
This method is often used in physics, if, e.g., we have the
expression of x as a sum of the infinite series (e.g., Taylor
series in perturbation methods). Then, if, e.g., second order
terms are negligibly small, we neglect quadratic and higher
order terms, and use the linear expression as an approximation
to the desired solution (see, e.g., [6]).
If we are solving the equation f (x) = y with known y, then
we stop when f (xk ) becomes close enough to y – i.e., when
dX (f (x), y) ≤ δ for some δ > 0.
Both stopping criteria can be viewed as particular cases of
the following general definition:
Definition 2. Let X be a definable metric space, and let S be
a definable set of convergent sequences of X.
• Let {xk } ∈ S, k be an integer, and ε > 0 a real number.
We say that xk is ε−accurate if dX (xk , lim xp ) ≤ ε.
• Let d ≥ 1 be an integer. By a stopping criterion, we mean
a function c : X d → R0+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0} that satisfies
the following two properties:
• If {xk } ∈ S, then c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) → 0.
• If for some {xn } ∈ S and for some k,
c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) = 0, then xk = . . . = xk+d−1 =
lim xp .
The two above-described criteria correspond to c(x, x ) =
dX (x, x ) and c(x) = dX (f (x), y).

Proposition 3. Let c be a stopping criterion. Then, for every
ε, there exists a δ > 0 such that if a sequence {xn } is not
abnormal, and c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) ≤ δ, then xk is ε−accurate.
Proof. As An , we will take the set of all sequences for which
for some k, c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) ≤ 2−n and dX (xk , x) > ε.
Clearly, An ⊇ An+1 .
Let us show that the intersection ∩An is empty. Indeed,
suppose that the sequence {xk } belongs to this intersection.
This means that for every n, there exists a k(n) such that
c(xk(n) , . . . , xk(n)+d−1 ) ≤ 2−n and dX (xk(n) , x) > ε. If
some value k is equal to k(n) for infinitely many n, this
means that c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) ≤ 2−n for all n and hence,
that c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) = 0. From the definition of a stopping criterion, it then follows that xk = x, so d(xk , x) =
0 > ε. Hence, k(n) → ∞, so (since {xk } is convergent),
dX (xk(n) , x) → 0 and dX (xk(n) , x) > ε. The contradiction
shows that the intersection is empty.
So, there exists an N for which AN ∩ T = ∅. Hence, we
can take δ = 2−N . Q.E.D.
Comment. So, if we restrict ourselves to not abnormal sequences only (i.e., sequence that stem from not abnormal,
physical observations), then c(xk , . . . , xk+d−1 ) ≤ δ guarantees that we are ε-close to the desired solution.
In particular, dX (xk , xk+1 ) ≤ δ and d(f (xk ), y) ≤ δ
guarantee that dX (xn , x) ≤ ε.
In case we are summing a numerical series xk = a1 + . . . +
ak , we have d(xk , xk+1 ) = |ak+1 |, so, this stopping criterion
means that means if the next term is negligible (|ak+1 | ≤ δ),
then we are ε−close to the sum: |xk − x| ≤ ε.
VIII. WHEN RESTRICTED TO TYPICAL OBJECTS,
MANY NUMERICAL PROBLEMS BECOME
ALGORITHMICALLY DECIDABLE
Another possible application involves constructive real numbers, i.e., real numbers x for which we can – by computations
(like with π) or by measurement – obtain, for every k, a 2−k approximation rk (for which |rk − x| ≤ 2−k ). We can have
several constructive real numbers x, x , . . . , x corresponding
to different measurable physical quantities. Based on the
results of more and more accurate measurements of these
numbers, we would like to check whether the actual values
def
satisfy a desired property; e.g., whether for the vector X =


(x, x , . . . , x ), we have f (X) ≥ 0 for a given multi-variate
function f . (Sometimes, we would like to check whether
f (X) > 0, this is equivalent to checking whether g(X) ≥
def
0, for g(X) = −f (X).) In general, it is algorithmically
impossible to decide whether a given constructive number is
non-negative or not; see, e.g., [9].
We can (easily) prove that there exists a k such that for every
not abnormal vector X, either f (X) ≥ 0 or f (X) < −2−k .
In practice, the function f (X) is continuous, hence there
exists l such that if we know X with accuracy 2−l , then we
can determine f (X) with accuracy 2−(k+1) – and thus, tell
whether f (X) ≥ 0 or whether f (X) < −2−k . So, if we

know that the actual vector is typical, then, after computing
(or measuring) it with accuracy 2−l , we will be able to tell
whether f (X) ≥ 0 or f (X) < 0. Thus, for typical values,
the generally undecidable problem becomes algorithmically
decidable. (Of course, the catch is that we do not know l – it
depends on the selection of a typical set T .)
We can now use this result to find out, for a given spatial
accuracy ε, where a given constructive function f (X) attains
it maximum on a given box [x1 , x1 ] × . . . × [xn , xn ]. Indeed,
we can divide the box into sub-boxes of size ≤ ε, and
algorithmically compute the maximum of f over each subbox
[9]. When a function is typical, the difference between its
maxima on two constructive subbox is also typical – so we
can algorithmically decide whether the two maxima are equal
or one is larger – and thus find out for which subbox the
maximum is the largest; this is where the maximum is located
– so have determined this location with the given spatial
accuracy ε.
IX. A DDITIONAL I DEA : D EGREE OF T YPICALNESS
In the main text, we largely considered a set of typical
elements T of a given universal set. It makes sense to also
consider typical elements of different subsets of T : e.g., in
addition to a typical height of a person, it may be reasonable
to consider a typical height of a child or a typical height of
a person living in Russia. For that, we must assume that we
for some universal set U , we have a mapping that assigns, to
every L-definable set A ⊆ U , a non-empty set T (A) that is a
set of typical elements for A.
In the above text, we implicitly assumed that every object
a ∈ A can be classified as either a typical element of A or an
abnormal element of A. According to common sense, however,
being typical or abnormal may be a matter of degree. How can
we extend our description to this “degree of typicalness”?
Typical means, e.g., that if we have no prior information
about a real number, that it is reasonable to assume that this
real number is not abnormal. Later on, we may learn that
there are some features of this particular situation that make it
atypical; however, if all we know is that the object is atypical,
we should still be able to conclude that it a “typical” element
of the class of abnormal objects, “typical exception” – crudely
speaking, an abnormal object of degree 1. Alternatively, it may
turn out to be an abnormal object is an exception even among
exceptions – i.e., abnormal of degree at least 2, etc.
How can we describe this formally? We have shown that
once a logico-mathematical theory L that formalizes the
physical knowledge is fixed, in a larger (meta-)theory M,
we can talk about definable and typical objects. In this metatheory M, we can define what it means for a set T (A) ⊆ A to
be the set of all typical (not abnormal) elements of the set A.
As we have mentioned, to fully describe physicists’ reasoning, we should assume that one such set T (A) was selected
for all (or at least for some) definable sets A. The model of the
original theory L + this selection provides, in effect, a model
of an extended theory L , in which, in addition to the original
basic properties, relations, and basic functions, we also have a

new basic property – that a is a typical element of A. In this
extended theory L , the term “typical” is part of the theory,
thus, e.g., the set T (A) is explicitly definable in the new theory
– while it was not definable in the original physical theory L.
On top of this extended theory L , we can also build a
new meta-theory M , and in this new meta-theory, we can
talk about the typical elements of sets which are definable in
L . In particular, in this new meta-theory M , we can talk
def
about typical elements of the set Ab(A) = A \ T (A) of
all abnormal elements. The set T (Ab(A)) of all such typical elements consists of “typical exceptions”, i.e., abnormal
elements of degree 1. Remaining elements, i.e., elements of
def
the set Ab2 (A) = Ab(A) \ T (Ab(A)), are elements which are
exceptions even among exceptions, i.e., they are abnormal of
degree 2.
Similarly, we can defined a yet another meta-theory and talk
about elements of degree at least 3, etc. The general definition
of the set Abk (A) of all elements abnormal of degree ≥ k is
Ab1 (A) = A \ T (A) and Abk+1 = Abk (A) \ T (Abk (A)). The
degree of abnormality of an abnormal element a ∈ A can then
be defined as the largest integer k for which a ∈ Abk (A).
X. B EYOND M AXITIVE M EASURES
We have mentioned that we also want to exclude events A
of low probability. We have also mentioned that the threshold
probability of an event – below which this event is impossible
– should depend on the complexity of this event.
In probability theory, it is usually sufficient to consider
events belonging to the Borel σ-algebra, i.e., the smallest σalgebra generated by open and closed subsets of the original
set U . It also makes sense to only consider probability measures defined on this σ-algebra; for every such event A and
probability measure p, the probability p(A) is well-defined.
Let c(A) > 0 denote this threshold “complexity” of event
A. Then, for a probability measure p, if p(A) < c(A), then A
is impossible, i.e., T (p) ∩ A = ∅, where T (p) denotes the set
of typical elements corresponding to p.
Definition 3. Let p be a definable probability measure, and let
c be a function that maps every definable set into a positive
real number. We say that a set T (p) is consistent with c and p if
T (p)∩A = ∅ for every definable set A for which p(A) < c(A).
What are the conditions on the “complexity measure” c
under which a consistent set T (p) exists for every p? It turns
out that these conditions can be formulated in terms of the
following property:
Definition 4. We say that a 
sequence of sets {Xi } is ∪independent if for all i, Xi ⊆
Xj .
j=i

Proposition 4.
• If for every definable probability measures p, there exists
a non-empty set T (p) that is consistent with c and p, then
for
 all ∪-independent definable families {Xi }, we have
c(Xi ) ≤ 1.

•

•

Let 0 < ε < 1. If for every definable probability measures
p, there exists a set T (p) that is consistent
 with c and
p and for which p(T (p)) ≥ 1 − ε, then
c(Xi ) ≤ ε
for all ∪-independent definable families {Xi } for which
∪Xi = U .

Let 0 < ε < 1. If
c(Xi ) ≤ ε for all ∪-independent
definable families {Xi }, then for every definable probability measure p, there exists a set T (p) that is consistent
with c and p and for which p(T (p)) ≥ 1 − ε.

Proof. Let us first consider the case when a non-empty consistent set T (p) exists for every definable probability measure
∞

c(Xi ) > 1. In this case,
p. Let us assume that, vice versa,
def

for some finite n, we have s =

i=1
n


i=1

c(Xi ) = 1. Since the

family {X
i } is ∪-independent, for every i ≤ n, there exist
Xj . So, all n elements xi are different, and each
xi ∈ Xi \
j=i

Xi contains xi but not any other xj .
We can now define a probability measure p concentrated on
xi , with p({xi }) = c(Xi )/s. Here, p(Xi ) = p({xi }). Since
s > 1, we have p(Xi ) < c(Xi ), hence each event Xi = xi is
impossible. So, for this p, we have xi ∈ T (p). On the other
def
hand, for A = U \ {x1 , . . . , xn }), we have p(A) = 0 < c(A),
so elements = xi are also impossible – which contradicts to
T (p) = ∅.
Let us now assume that for every p, there exists a consistent
set
 T (p) for which p(T (p))
 ≥ 1 − ε. Let us prove that
c(Xi ) ≤ ε. Indeed, if
c(Xi ) > ε, then there exist a
def
finite
∪-independent
family
{X
1 , . . . , Xn } for which s =

c(Xi ) > ε. Select xi as in the first part of this proof.
Since ∪Xi = U , there exists an element x0 ∈ ∪Xi . Pick
δ > 0 so small that we still have s/(1 + δ) > ε,
 and take
p({xi }).
p({xi }) = c(Xi )/(1 + δ) and p({x0 }) = 1 −
Here, p(Xi ) = p({xi }) = c(Xi )/(1 + δ) < c(Xi ) hence
T (p) ∩ Xi = ∅. So, T (p) ⊆ X \ ∪Xi . However, p(∪Xi ) =

p({xi }) = s/(1+δ), so p(∪Xi ) > ε hence p(T (p)) < 1−ε
– a contradiction with our assumption.

Finally, let
c(Xi ) ≤ ε for all ∪-independent families
{Xi }. Let us show that as T (p), we can take whatever remains
after we exclude all L-definable sets A with p(A) < c(A).
To prove that T (p) = ∅, we will prove that for every n, after
excluding n such sets, the remainder Tn has a measure ≥ 1−ε.
Thus, the limit set T (p) – after excluding (countably many)
definable sets for which p(A) < c(A) – will also have measure
≥ 1 − ε > 0.
Let A1 , . . . , An be sets that we excluded because p(Ai ) <
c(Ai ). Overall, we excluded the union ∪Ai . If one of these set
Ai is contained in the union of others, then we do not need to
explicitly exclude it – it is excluded automatically when we
exclude others. So, we can delete this set from the list Ai of
explicitly excluded sets. By repeating this procedure, we will
eventually end up with a ∪-independent subset
 Ai – with the
this subset,
c(Ai ) ≤ ε, so,
same union ∪Ai as before. For
since p(Ai ) < c(Ai ), we have
p(Ai ) < ε.

The probability measure
 p(∪Ai ) of the excluded union ∪Ai
cannot exceed the sum
p(Ai ) and is, hence ≤ ε. Thus, the
remainder has a measure ≥ 1 − ε. The proposition is proven.
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A PPENDIX
What is the relation between T (A) for different sets A?
Some such properties are described in [8]; here is one more.
Proposition 5. Let U be the set of all real numbers, and let T
be a mapping that maps every L-definable non-empty subset
A ⊆ U into a non-empty set T (A) of typical elements w.r.t. A.
Then there exist non-empty sets A, B, and C for which A ⊆ B,
T (B) ⊆ C, and T (A) ⊆ C.
Proof. Let B = [0, 1]. As a sequence Bn , let us take Bn =
(0, 1/n). This is a L-definable monotonic sequence with the
empty intersection, so, due to our Definition, there exists an
integer N for which BN ∩ T (B) = ∅. Hence, for A = AN
and C = B \ BN , we have A ⊆ B, T (B) ⊆ B \ BN = C,
but T (A) ⊆ A = BN and therefore T (A) ∩ C = ∅. Q.E.D.
Comment. A natural interpretation of a commonsense statements like “normally, A implies B” is that typical elements
of A have the property B, i.e., that T (A) ⊆ B. It is well
known that such commonsense implication is sometimes not
transitive: e.g., penguins (A) are birds (B), birds normally
fly (C), but penguins do not normally fly. Our proposition
proves that the existence of a non-transitivity example is not
accidental: it follows from the very definition of typicality.

